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"The Triumph of Life" is a cryptic final work for 
Shelley to leave to posterity. It is both unlike and 
yet like his previous work. It is unlike in that it 
addresses itself to the non-ideal, to a cruel and 
devastating present existence. 1 It is like in that it 
displays that "tough-minded" Shelleyan scepticism that 
C. E. Pulos has elucidated so well. 2 The Shelley who 
wrote the final line of "Mont Blanc", who included the 
famous last speech of Demogorgon in Prometheus 
Unbound, is in this poem given full rein. The debate 
still rages as to whether he allows any idealism into 
"The Triumph of Life" at all. 
This closely structured poem, full of gripping 
images that remain with one long after the poem has 
been read, is Shelley at his best. In it, the poet 
who wrote the "Ode to the West Wind" brings his deep 
concern with the nature of life to fruition. The 
issues that emerge from an analysis of the text 
reflect this concern with the fundamentals of 
existence. For this reason, I believe it to be -
despite its fragmentary nature - a great document on 
modern life. 
* * * * 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an 
apparatus with ~ich to read Shelley's final poem. 
To this end, I first present a concise summary of the 
major critical writings on the poem from this century, 
1 Perhaps only The Cenci approaches the same 
degree of disillusionment. 
2 C. E. Pulos, The Deep Truth: A Study of 
Shelley's Scepticism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1954). 
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to give a context for my own reading, which follows. 
In my commentary, I intend to show that Shelley began 
by depicting life as being characteri~ed by a lack of 
absolute knowledge due to our faulty and limited sense 
perception. He paints a world in which reality is 
seen rather as layered experience, with dreams and 
shadows simply a different level within this 
experience. Human consciousness is controlled by 
desire, which is the means through which Life assaults 
us. Life is a corrupting, enervating force, but 
Shelley wished to show the moral duty of the 
individual to resist this weakening and to promote the 
naturally good, humanistic abilities in self and 
others. However, as the poem progresses, Shelley's 
images set up a situation that Shelley himself cannot 
see a way out of. The process of the poem depicts a 
greater power inevitably subsuming a lesser power; 
this process is repeated on a larger and larger scale 
until total loss of individuality results. Virtually 
all of Shelley's poetic images in the poem are drawn 
into this process, and having set it up, Shelley 
cannot see a way out of it, and is forced to cease 
writing. 
The poem depicts the life of a strong individual 
involved in this process. Rousseau's account is a 
reliving of his conscious life up to the 'present' of 
the poem. Rousseau recalls his 'awakening' into 
consciousness in a manner that suggests both Keatsian 
and Lacanian theories of human development. His 
personality dict~s the means by which he is ushered 
into mature life: the Shape all light seduces his 
willing senses, and appeals to his philosophy that 
trusts intuitive nature over reason. The critical 
point about this experience is that it is inevitable; 
all individuals must leave childhood and move into an 
adult, mature apprehension of the nature of life. The 
Shape all light is related to every stage of the power 
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progression in the poem, and as such is the means 
through which Rousseau grows. 
Rousseau describes the phantom-making of the 
multitude around the chariot in a narrative that 
closely resembles the speaker's perception of the 
crowd at the beginning of the poem. In both accounts, 
it becomes apparent that the individuals in the crowd 
are creating their own destruction by making and 
reifying 'phantoms' of belief, which then turn upon 
their creators and persecute them. Indeed, the desire 
that is at the centre of human consciousness, and that 
initiates this tragedy, is conversely the instigator 
of all the positive impulses in mankind, the 'going-
out' of one's self that Shelley speaks of. This 
tragedy is the final irony of life: not only is 
corruption inevitable and self-created, but it also 
mocks and denigrates the goodness in our human spirit. 
The poem begins by emphasising the speaker's 
responsibility to act effectively in this world. 
However, by the end of Rousseau's account of life as 
ironic tragedy, the speaker's sense of moral 
responsibility has become an exercise in futility. 
His final question demonstrates this on several 
levels. Shelley's original intention of purposeful 
action amidst the corruption has itself been corrupted 
in the poem. 
* * * * 
I would like to end this brief foreword by 
acknowledging the influence and assistance of my 
supervisor for this thesis, Dr. Greg Crossan. His 
cool-headed, reasoned and objective readings of the 
Romantics that yet remained open to the often intense 
feeling in the poetry were immensely refreshing, and 
first attracted me to these poets. He initially 
directed me towards this poem as a thesis topic, and 
has helped clarify the issues and problems ever since. 
Thanks, Greg. 
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A CRITICAL HISTORY. 
The critical history of "The Triumph of Life" is 
characterised by both the diversity and the challenge 
of its readings. The diversity is apparent in 
readings that range across a broad variety of 
approaches, and that reach often wildly conflicting 
conclusions. The challenge lies in the fact that most 
of these readings are comprehensive and coherent, 
giving consistent accounts of the poem that cannot be 
simply dismissed. The reader of such a history moves 
from bewilderment to a sense of exciting diversity, 
and, moreover, begins to suspect that this was 
Shelley's intention for the poem. 
The fact that the poem remains unfinished 
certainly contributes to the openness of its 
interpretation. Likewise, the fact that it is 
Shelley's final work (even though through sheer 
accident) gives it the significance of being Shelley's 
'last word'. In this necessarily brief overview of 
the major discussions on the poem, I have chosen 
Yeats' seminal essay "The Philosophy of Shelley's 
Poetry", published in 1900, as the chronological 
starting point, and have examined the various writings 
through to 1988. It has become apparent that two 
philosophical schools of thought have dominated the 
criticism of the poem during this time: firstly, that 
of idealism, usually of a nee-platonic variety, and 
secondly, that of post-structuralism. The former is 
the central issue for most interpreters up until the 
late 1960's and early 1970's (who either support or 
react against it), and then the latter approach begins 
to emerge as a preferred reading strategy. The range 
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of responses within these broad philosophical 
arguments is nevertheless very wide, and there are 
interpretations that use neither argument. In this 
study I will focus on these two areas to outline the 
main responses to "The Triumph of Life". Rather than 
follow a chronological order, I have preferred to 
place the various commentaries in relation to each 
other according to their response to the poem. 
I should perhaps point out at this juncture that 
the New Critics' contributions to this history are 
virtually non-existent. Leavis labelled the poem a 
"bewildering phantasmagoria", 3 and T. S. Eliot found 
it one of the few acceptable pieces that Shelley 
wrote, 4 but apart from these rather terse comments 
Shelley's last poem rates little mention. The New 
Critics' discrediting of Shelley has itself been 
discredited as simplistic and reactionary, and at any 
rate adds little to any discussion on this poem. 
I. Idealist Approaches 
This mode of criticism has dominated most 
discussion on Shelley, though since C. E. Pulos' 
landmark study The Deep Truth: A Study of Shelley's 
Scepticism, the way has opened up for more sceptical 
readings of Shelley's poetry and philosophy. A very 
3 F. R. Leavis, Revaluation, (London, 1936). 
Cited in Nancy Fogarty' s Shelley in the Twentieth 
Century: A Study of the Development of Shelley 
Criticism in England and America, 1916-1971, Romantic 
Reassessment, 56 (Salzburg: Institut fur Englische 
Sprache und Literatur, Universitat Salzburg, 1976), 
p.138. 
4 T. S. Eliot, "Talk on Dante", The Adelphi, 27 
(1st Quarter, 1951), 110-112. Cited in Harold Bloom's 
Shelley's Mythmaking (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1959; rpt. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1969), p.223. (Hereafter referred 
to as Bloom. ) 
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simple description of the basic assumptions behind the 
idealistic readings of "The Triumph of Life" follows. 
Like Plato, Shelley saw life as a series of dim, 
distorted reflections of an ideal reality beyond life 
- Plato's shadows in the cave. Plato believed that 
the ideal reality could be perceived in life, through 
the use of 'pure reason'. Shelley rather felt that 
the ideal could be perceived and finally achieved in 
life through the 'poetic impulse' . Shelley's neo-
platonism is therefore tempered by his belief in a 
Godwinian perfectibility, the hope that humanity could 
usher in the apocalyptically perfect world of 
Prometheus Unbound. 
This basic philosophical belief is used as a 
departure point for a broad spectrum of 
interpretations of "The Triumph of Life", ranging from 
supremely optimistic to utterly pessimistic. At the 
positive end of the spectrum we find W. B. Yeats' 
essay, "The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry". 5 Yeats 
outlines Shelley's strong desire for a new, di vine 
order based on Intellectual Beauty, which can only be 
brought about by a regeneration in the heart of each 
individual. There are forces for and against this 
regeneration, and "The Triumph of Life" depicts the 
negative forces in Rousseau's account of the phantoms. 
Yeats elucidates Shelley's symbols in a totally 
platonic mode, and many of these apply to "The 
Triumph". The sun is the source of tyranny in life; 
the moon is beautiful but death-like; the 
morning/evening star is a symbol for all that Shelley 
holds as good. 
A. C. Bradley's "Notes on Shelley's 'The Triumph 
5 w. B. Yeats, "The Philosophy of 
Poe try" in =Ea.:s:.::s::.:a=--y...,s_----'a=n=d=----=I:.:.n:;.;t:.:r:;.;o=-d=u~c"""t=i=o::..::n-=s 




of Life' ", 6 published in 1914, is the first to 
establish Shelley's sources in Petrarch and 
particularly Dante, and also to trace the echoes from 
Shelley's earlier works. In foregrounding the links 
with these early Renaissance Christian writers, 
Bradley establishes his belief that Shelley was 
tending towards Christianity himself. His reading 
illuminates much that is cryptic in the poem, such as 
the reference to Plato's love for the boy Aster, and 
the physical geography of Rousseau's dream. He also, 
as Bloom points out, begins the prevalent reading of 
the Shape all light as a manifestation of the Ideal, 
and her obliteration of Rousseau's thoughts as "the 
effect of a revelation of the ideal in obliterating 
the modes of thought and feeling habitual before that 
revelation" (p.454). This interpretation reveals the 
central assumptions of neo-platonism and the 
perfectibility of the pure and strong. 
F. Melian Stawell also adopts this very 
optimistic nee-platonic structure in her essay 
"Shelley's 'The Triumph of Life'". 7 Stawell sees the 
poem as a "grave and warning appeal to the will" 
(p.110) to master the dangerous passion of love. She 
outlines the heavy Faustian influence on the poem via 
Goethe, but believes that for Shelley it is only a 
matter of time before the "true sun" will emerge as 
the "Principle of Good" (p.116). The captives are all 
noble men whose potential has been denied. Rousseau's 
Shape all light represents the Supreme Good, but 
Rousseau is too impure to drink of her cup worthily, 
and so is overcome by it. Finally, though, Stawell 
6 A. C. Bradley, "Notes on Shelley's 'The Triumph 
of Life' ", MLR, IX (October, 1914), 441-456. 
7 F. Melian Stawell, "Shelley's 'The Triumph of 
Life' ", Essays and Studies by Members of the English 
Association, V (1914), rpt. 1966, pp.104-131. 
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indicates the numerous hints of a "deeper life" that 
run through the poem, to conclude that the poem would 
have ended with "a vision in which the Conqueror would 
be conquered" (p.130). 
Kenneth Cameron, in his essay entitled "The 
Social Philosophy of Shelley", 8 proposes that Shelley 
believed in an historical evolution; that history was 
"essentially a struggle between ... the forces of 
liberty and the forces of despotism" (p. 512). For 
Shelley, the forces of liberty had been permanently 
released during his lifetime, and he believed that 
humanity was moving inexorably on to a perfect 
society. In 1974, Cameron examines "The Triumph of 
Life" in the light of this argument, in The Golden 
Years. 9 "One can assume, then," he writes, "that the 
overall social philosophy of Shelley's works from 
Queen Mab to Charles the First also underlies 'The 
Triumph of Life'" ( p. 453). Cameron focusses on the 
captives and the multitude around the chariot, whose 
obsession with power and wealth blinds them to the 
benignant power around them which could change their 
situation if they willed it. Rousseau's dream is of 
his birth, and then of his perception of the nature of 
the world; the Shape all light reveals this to him so 
that he can plunge into life and change it, even 
though it deforms him. So Cameron reads the work as 
describing the ways to break down the evils preventing 
us from progressing along the path of historical 
evolution. 
Neville Rogers, in Shelley At Work: A Critical 
8 Kenneth Neill Cameron, "The Social Philosophy 
of Shelley", The Sewanee Review, L, 4 (Autumn, 1942), 
rpt. in Shelley's Poetry and Prose, ed. Donald H. 
Reiman and Sharon B. Powers (New York: Norton, 1977), 
pp.511-519. 
9 Kenneth Neill Cameron, Shelley: The Golden 
Years (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1974), pp.445-474. 
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Enquiry, 10 follows a similar line. The captives around 
the chariot are those who have fallen short of their 
ideal, because the world has seduced and corrupted 
them with 'blood and gold'. Rogers believes that "The 
Triumph" would have ended optimistically, showing that 
escape from corruption was possible. He interprets 
Shelley's last letters as looking forward to the 
future with hope. 
A recent optimistic and idealistic reading of the 
poem is Fred Milne's "The Eclipsed Imagination in 
Shelley's 'The Triumph of Life' 11 , 11 published in 1981. 
Although Milne does not mention neo-platonic 
philosophy, the assumptions of a Blakean, humanistic 
ideal are the basis of this reading. Milne argues that 
"The Triumph of Life" explores what happens when an 
individual displaces the light of the imagination with 
the light of the intellect as the principal mode of 
knowledge. Milne contends that "The Triumph" 
reiterates "one of the central ideas in A Defence of 
Poetry" (681): the need for the imagination to guide 
the reason. Imagination is symbolized in the poem as 
the sun, which the speaker rejects and so invokes a 
vision of life under the aegis of the moon, the symbol 
for reason. The captives are all the product of the 
reason usurping imagination. Similarly, Rousseau 
rejects the Shape all light, who is part of the ideal 
world, because his reason demands answers to questions 
of selfhood. He must undergo a purgatorial reliving of 
life to learn his mistake, a mistake which Milne 
believes the speaker will learn from. 
Exemplary of the contradictory responses to this 
10 Neville Rogers, Shelley At Work: A Critical 
Enquiry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956). 
11 Fred Milne, "The Eclipsed Imagination in 




commentary by Roland 
Poetry of Involvement 12 
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A. Duerksen in 
shows a similar 
'humanistic idealism to that in Milne's essay, but 
arrives at a very different reading of the poem. 
Duerksen believes Shelley's philosophy was based on 
two precepts: "the freedom of the individual mind to 
make its own choices", and that same mind's 
responsibility to promote equal freedom amongst all 
human beings ( p. 6) . This fusion of rationalism and 
social responsibility was effected through love, a 
self-generated "urge toward union or community with 
another" (p.32). Duerksen believes that "The Triumph" 
upholds this doctrine, by showing how humanity 
imprisons itself by refusing to trust the mind as the 
instrument to freedom. The chariot of Life is a mental 
construct, a result of this limited vision. 'Real 
'life is available to humanity, if each individual 
will trust to his or her own reason. Thus, what Milne 
sees as the cause of corruption, Duerksen sees as the 
saviour. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive presentation of 
an optimistic, nee-platonic reading of the poem is 
Donald Reiman' s Shelley's "The Triumph of Life" :A 
Critical Study. 13 Like Duerksen, Reiman believes 
Shelley's basic philosophy was the right and duty of 
every individual to rule his own destiny and to seek 
his own and others' happiness. Reiman is more 
pessimistic as to the possibility of this happening: 
he cites Shelley's scepticism as indicating the poet's 
awareness that the ideal may be illusory. In "The 
Triumph of Life", the sad realities of Life are 
12 Roland A. Duerksen, Shelley's Poetrv of 
Involvement (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988). 
13 Donald H. Reiman, Shelley's "The Triumoh of 
Life": A Critical Study, Illinois Studies in Language 
and Literature, 55 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965) . 
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contrasted with the possibilities open to man if he 
exercises his will and liberates himself from external 
Necessity and personal passions. Rousseau's mistake 
was to seek the eternal in the mortal, notably the 
Shape all light; inevitably he was disappointed and 
awakened rather to a knowledge of evil. While Reiman 
sees Shelley's problem as the idealist's difficulty of 
maintaining a vision of the Ideal whist living in 
flawed reality, he is nevertheless assuming that the 
ideal is a positive option. "Everywhere in 'The 
Triumph of Life' the dark side of human experience is 
balanced by positive alternatives" (p.84). 
Desmond King-Hele, in Shelley: His Thought and 
Work, 14 believes that Shelley wished to show how we 
can triumph over our present travails in life. He 
speculates that the Dantean influence in the poem 
meant that Shelley was intending to end "The Triumph 
of Life" with a Paradiso, so bringing it into line 
with the earlier Prometheus Unbound. King-Hele is 
heavily influenced by the earlier, important reading 
by Carlos Baker in his book Shelley's Major Poetry: 
The Fabric of a Vision. 15 Baker acknowledges the 
difference between "The Triumph" and Shelley's earlier 
poetry, in the detached speaker and in the focus on 
worldly life to the almost complete exclusion of 
divine life. He outlines Shelley's growing sense of 
the corrupting forces in society, and concludes that 
the poem shows only three ways to escape such forces: 
early death, withdrawal from society, or forming a new 
society of like-minded individuals. Death is chosen 
for Shelley. 
14 Desmond King-Hele, Shelley: His Thought and 
Work, 3rd ed. (1960; rpt. Rutherford, Madison, 
Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984). 
15 Carlos Baker, Shelley's Major Poetry: The 
Fabric of a Vision (1948; rpt. New York: Russell and 
Russell, 1961). 
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Baker's reading was not the first of the more 
pessimistic commentaries on "The Triumph of Life". 
Carl Grabo, in The Maaic Plant: The Growth of 
Shelley's Thought16 gives a strongly autobiographical 
background to the poem, emphasising the tremendous 
difficulties Shelley faced in his later life. Again, 
a strong neo-platonic atmosphere is invoked: the world 
is utterly corrupted but a Divine Reality exists, of 
which the Shape all light is the guardian. She gives 
Rousseau a vision of Life as it really is, and as 
Grabo believed Shelley saw it. The poem illustrates, 
for Grabo, Shelley's rejection of the world for a 
reality of the mind, an inner life of thought that was 
intuitively neo-platonic. 
Along autobiographical lines, two others pursue 
Grabo's approach to the poem. G. M. Matthews, in his 
1962 essay "On Shelley's 'The Triumph of Life' 1117 sees 
the ultimate enemy of the natural order in society, as 
depicted in the poem, as "the acquisitive principle, 
the pursuit of self interest" (p.128). Matthews 
proposes that Shelley felt that his love for Jane 
Williams had become a selfish passion, an example of 
the opportunism depicted in the poem. Positive, 
beautiful life was available, but was too often 
submerged under self-gratification. Rousseau stands as 
a monitory example of this, and the speaker relives 
his experience to the point of decision. Matthews 
suggests that a positive choice is difficult to make, 
as it was for Shelley. 
A second semi-biographical reading within the 
idealist framework is offered by Charles E. Robinson 
16 Carl Grabo, The Magic Plant: The Growth of 
Shelley's Thought (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1936). 
17 G. M. Matthews, "On Shelley's 'The Triumph of 
Life"', Studia Neophilologica, XXXIV, ( 1962), 104-
134. 
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in Shelley and Byron: The Snake and Eagle Wreathed in 
Fight. 18 Robinson believes that Shelley devised "The 
Triumph" as the seventh and final book in Petrarch's 
series, and that the 'Life' of the title was really 
Life-in-Death, or a purgatorial existence. Shelley, 
Robinson suggests, was terrified of death, because he 
feared he would not reach the blissful immortality of 
the sacred few, but would be condemned to an afterlife 
still enslaved by Life. Robinson associates this with 
Shelley's sense of failure beside Byron's success. 
This is an appropriate moment to mention C. E. 
Pulos' book The Deep Truth: A Study of Shelley's 
Scepticism, 19 a brilliant exposition of Shelley's 
sceptical empiricism and pseudo-platonic faith. Pulos 
shows how the poet's empirical and Humean background 
convinced him that certain, absolute knowledge was 
impossible, and yet Shelley's intuition made him 
simultaneously hope for an ideal beyond this 
existence. In "The Triumph of Life", Pulos attempts to 
argue, Shelley reconciles this conflict dramatically 
by having the speaker (Shelley as himself) take on the 
role of the detached spectator. The 'sacred few' 
represent the Ideal, but the speaker is not one of 
them; he is rather tied to the sceptical, empiricist 
world of Life. 
What is becoming apparent in this overview is the 
way these different interpretations range across a 
spectrum from optimism to pessimism. Peter Butter, in 
a short article that attempts to make sense of these 
varying interpretations, 20 concludes that each of the 
central images of the poem the Sun, Rousseau' s 
18 Charles E. Robinson, Shelley and Byron: The 
Snake and Eagle Wreathed in Fight (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
19 Op. cit. 
20 Peter Butter, "Sun and Shape in Shelley's 'The 
Triumph of Life'", RES, 13 (1962), 40-51. 
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birth, the Shape all light - carries ambiguities which 
must simply be acknowledged and accepted. In the world 
of "The Triumph", Butter says, the Ideal is transitory 
and remote, and full knowledge of it is impossible in 
this life. 
Perhaps the final extreme on the spectrum of the 
idealist readings is represented by Ross Woodman's 
1964 book, The Apocalyptic Vision in the Poetry of 
Shelley. 21 Woodman believes that Shelley became more 
repulsed by the material world of humanity, because it 
kept him from the eternal. This explains his movement 
from moral reform to visionary poetry. Woodman 
presents an interesting dilemma: Shelley finally had 
to acknowledge Plato's rejection of poets, and so 
Shelley's own visionary poetry turns and condemns 
itself. Woodman therefore sees "The Triumph" as 
Shelley's recantation of poetry because it ties him to 
temporality. The imagination is rejected because it 
can only depict in mortal images: Rousseau's Shape all 
light is eternity clothed in mortal form, and so holds 
Rousseau in mortality. Woodman believes that the 
battle in Shelley between transcendence and 
incarnation is finally won by the former. 
Idealistic, nee-platonic structures provide a 
popular and often useful mode by which to read 
Shelley's poetry. In the group of commentators whom I 
wish to discuss next, there is a strong sense in which 
the writers have used idealistic structures only to 
react against them. Idealism is taken as a point of 
departure, and is dismantled. Once again, these 
responses range from pessimism to optimism. 
Perhaps one of the most idiosyncratic readings 
of "The Triumph of Life" is Harold Bloom's Shelley's 
Mythmaking, later developed in The Visionary Company: 
21 Ross Grieg Woodman, The Apocalyptic Vision in 
the Poetry of Shelley (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1964). 
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A Reading of English Romantic Poetry and Percy Bysshe 
Shelley. 22 Bloom rejects the proposition that the poem 
is Shelley's recantation; he sees it rather as 
promoting an 'apocalyptic humanism' of a Blakean 
nature, in which man is perfected through his own 
imaginative poetic impulse. The hierarchy of lights in 
the poem depicts the hierarchy of influences over 
humanity: the stars of night are imagination, the sun 
and Shape all light are the light of nature, and the 
light of the chariot is that of Life. Each in turn 
destroys the former, and Rousseau falls from divinity, 
through nature, into life. 
the 
Bloom's reading is pivotal 
possibility that Shelley 
in that he proposes 
is parodying his 
idealistic sources in the Bible, Dante, Mil ton and 
Blake. What distinguishes him from his legacy of 
pessimistic readings in Grabo, Baker and Pulos is his 
rejection of an idealistic, nee-platonic framework to 
explain the poem. He rather uses his Blakean model 
based on the philosophical system of Martin Buber, in 
which mortal relationships are either in the merging 
dialectic of an 'I-Thou' structure, or else in a 
binary opposition of 'I-It' . Bloom believes "The 
Triumph of Life" shows the absence and therefore 
illusoriness of the 'I-Thou' myth: Life is rather a 
22 Harold Bloom, op.cit.; The Visionary Company: 
A Reading of English Romantic Poets, 2nd ed. (1961; 
rpt. Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1971); Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. Harold Bloom, 
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1985). Since the 
writing of this thesis, a later development in Bloom's 
reading of "The Triumph" has come to my attention, in 
Poetry and Repression: Revisionism from Blake to 
Stevens (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). This 
focusses on Shelley as being torn between 
"Limitation", in which he interprets the world through 
the images of his father-figure, Wordsworth, and 
"Representation", in which he attempts to rebel 
against that state of creative "castration" by 
appropriating a Wordsworthian image and using it in a 
totally new, self-created context. 
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bleak 'I-It' series of relationships. How this accords 
with Bloom's "apocalyptic humanism" remains unstated. 
Edward Bostetter presents a far more 
straightforward reaction against idealism in his 
reading of the poem in The Romantic Ventriloquists: 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, Byron. 23 
Disenchantment, for Bostetter, is the dominant tone 
of the poem. Shelley shows how ideal symbols, such as 
the Shape all light, corrupt the notion of the ideal 
by their delusory and transitory nature. Rousseau, and 
by extension Shelley, fall victim to their own 
idealism - the inevitable lot of the poet. Bostetter 
concludes: "Could it be that the vision of life is the 
ultimate reality, and the dream of the ideal the 
illusion?" (p.189). 
Miriam Allott makes a similar response to the 
poem in "The Re-working of a Literary Genre: Shelley's 
'The Triumph of Life'". 24 Allott sees the poem as a 
dialogue of the mind with itself, in which two 
autobiographical narratives (the speaker's and 
Rousseau's) correspond with, and yet comment and 
expand on, each other. For both, life is a negative, 
amoral force that imprisons humanity, leaving death 
as the only escape. Shelley's sense of moral 
responsibility is blighted with an awareness that all 
action is parodied and corrupted. 
John Hodgson provides a very different anti-
idealist approach to the poem in his essay "' The 
World's Mysterious Doom': Shelley's 'The Triumph of 
23 Edward E. Bos tet ter, ~T~h_e __ ~R~o~m~a=n=t=i-=-c 
Ventriloquists: Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, 
Byron, 2nd ed. (1963; rpt. Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 1975). 
24 Miriam Allott, "The Reworking of a Literary 
Genre: Shelley's 'The Triumph of Life'", in Essays on 
Shelley, ed. Miriam Allott (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1982), pp.239-278. 
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Life'". 25 He is the first to read the poem as a vision 
of the afterlife: Rousseau's dream is a movement from 
the sleep of death into a dream of remembered 
childhood innocence, and thence awakening into the 
afterlife, which turns out to be a purgatorial 
reliving of life. Hodgson believes this view of an 
afterlife reveals the nature of mortal life as being 
inevitable corruption. This shows Shelley's intense 
pessimism. 
Another commentator who approaches the extremes 
of cynicism in his anti-idealistic reading is James 
Rieger in The Mutiny Within: The Heresies of Percy 
Bysshe Shelley. 26 Rieger sees Shelley as a follower 
of the gnostic heresies of the early Christian church; 
his utter scepticism leads him to deliberate 
contradictoriness and obscurantism, and his profound 
questioning of the efficacy of life and art results 
in his eventual suicide. Rieger sees "The Triumph of 
Lifell as effectively Shelley's suicide note. 
In a refreshingly different commentary to the 
above anti-platonic readings of Shelley, Jerome J. 
McGann presents another option to what he sees as an 
'either/or' situation in Shelleyan criticism. In his 
essay "The Secrets of an Elder Day: Shelley after 
Hellas", he writes: "Most critics seem to have 
accepted implicity the idea that only two approaches 
are available to Shelley's last poem; either it was 
intended to be a reaffirmation of the Titanic 
Promethean myth of hope, or it was meant to depict the 
rejection not only of that myth, but of the 
possibility of poetry, and of a meaningful life as 
25 John A. Hodgson, "'The World's Mysterious 
Doom': Shelley's 'The Triumph of Life'", ELH, XL11, 4 
(Winter, 1975), 595-622. 
26 James Rieger, The Mutiny Within: The Heresies 
of Percy Bysshe Shelley (New York: Braziller, 1967). 
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well. 1127 McGann rather suggests that Shelley had come 
to see the inadequacy and divisiveness in idealism, 
and that he had accepted mortality and imaginative 
life in the present world. Rousseau in "The Triumph" 
could not do this: he exalted himself above mortality 
in an effort to confront 'the Absolute' , and was 
therefore punished by Life, who removed his perception 
of mortal beauty. The poet-narrator, McGann suggests, 
rejects Rousseau's path, and is prepared to accept 
mortal beauty, as the first forty lines of the poem 
show. 
In Merle Rubin's commentary on the poem, 
"Shelley's Skepticism: A Detachment Beyond Despair", 28 
Shelley's scepticism is taken to its logical 
conclusion, and places both idealistic hope and 
empirical life in equal doubt. Shelley gives us a 
detached spectator, who reserves final judgement on 
everything, and is protected from the relativity of 
externality by 'an adamantine veil' that shields such 
a spectator's heart and preserves him. Such a 
spectator can therefore see value in both the One and 
the Many, in unity and diversity. Rubin thus sees an 
optimistic light in "The Triumph" and believes that 
Shelley may well have ended the poem with a 
transformation scene in which the spectator could act 
effectively. The speaker is different to Rousseau, 
who accepted a faith when he accepted the Shape all 
light's cup of Nepenthe. Rubin states that the only 
faith for Shelley is scepticism, or the lack of faith, 
"for to embrace any doctrine or philosophical system 
is to submit to limitation" (p.367). 
27 Jerome J. Mc Gann, 
Shelley after Hellas", 
(1966), 25-41. 
"The Secrets of an Elder Day: 
Keats-Shelley Journal, 15 
28 Merle R. Rubin, "Shelley's Skepticism: A 
Detachment Beyond Despair", Philological Quarterly, 
59 (1980), 353-373. 
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Before leaving this overview of idealist and 
anti-idealist approaches to Shelley's poem, I should 
mention Edward Duffy's fascinating historiographical 
reading in Rousseau in England: The Context for 
Shelley's Critique of the Enlightenment. 29 Duffy sees 
the poem as a Shelleyan exercise in historical 
revisionism, in which Rousseau's notorious nineteenth 
century reputation as the initiator of the French 
Revolution is shown to be inaccurate. Rather, Shelley 
shows how the false ethos of the Enlightenment led 
both Rousseau and the Revolution astray, because it 
addressed only one level of the human psyche - the 
reason - and denied deeper levels of consciousness. 
Duffy proposes that Rousseau's denial of his ability 
to tap one of those deeper levels in 'reverie' is the 
reason for his 'fall': he is frightened of the Shape 
all light's offering of sublime reverie and clings to 
rationality with his questions. Duffy reads Rousseau 
as a dramatic monologuist trying to justify his 
actions but constantly betraying himself. His failure 
of poetic faculty becomes the failure of Europe. 
II. Metaphoric Approaches 
I use the word 'metaphoric' here to describe a 
general trend in criticism that focusses on Shelley's 
concern with language and representation. This trend 
is as broad in scope as the idealist readings, but 
central to it is the function of language as a 
paramount theme in interpreting Shelley's poetry. Such 
29 Edward Duffy, Rousseau in England: The Context 
for Shelley's Critique of the Enlightenment (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
1979) • 
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readings have dominated the last decade of Shelleyan 
criticism, and they are particularly applicable to 
"The Triumph of Life". 
One of the earliest studies to use this approach 
is Jerome J. McGann' s article, "Shelley's Veils: A 
Thousand Images of Loveliness". 30 Written five years 
after his earlier interpretation, this essay looks at 
Shelley's use of one of his favourite poetical 
concepts, the veil. McGann distinguishes three 
different kinds of Shelleyan veil: the old, outmoded 
ideas which hide the true beauty of life; the veil 
which Nature uses to clothe the world in beauty; and 
finally the veil of poetry which covers over the 
intuitive visions of the poet. McGann concludes that 
Shelley came to the realisation that the deep truth or 
ideal can never be achieved, because each stripping 
away of a veil in the first category, through poetry, 
necessarily involves a re-veiling of words . 
. 
Nevertheless, for McGann this is not a cause for 
despair: "the process is itself the crucial thing, for 
if words are helplessly ineffectual and metaphorical, 
the activity of continuous and related image-making 
reveals the self-creative powers of the mind ... " 
(p.206). In this way McGann links this essay with his 
earlier work, by showing how the very limitations of 
this existence are also the means to celebrate 
creative human ability. 
While this is a far cry from the later post-
structuralist readings of Paul de Man and Hillis 
Miller, the essay indicates the emerging focus on 
Shelley's interest in image-making as a constant 
process. McGann sees this as a positive process, the 
only attribute in life that approximates Shelley's 
30 Jerome J. McGann, "Shelley's Veils: A Thousand 
Images of Loveliness", -in Romantic and Victorian, ed. 
W. Paul Elledge and Richard L. Hoffmann (Cranbury, New 
Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971), 
198-218. . 
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earlier ideal realm. Lisa Steinman is another critic 
who foregrounds this process as a positive thing. In 
"From 'Alastor' to 'The Triumph of Life' : Shelley on 
the Nature and Source of Linguistic Pleasure" 31 
Steinman examines Shelley's philosophical theory, as 
outlined in his prose, to conclude that Shelley 
believed the fundamental human desire is to locate our 
origins and source - our ignorance of which creates a 
void in our existences. Our search, using words and 
poetry, can only create images which reflect that 
void, like Shelley's recurring chasm image - "an image 
of a lack of images, one which emblematizes the mind's 
bafflement - the failure of thought and language" 
(p.26). We can never get a glimpse or image of the 
actual source. Rousseau's failure in "The Triumph", 
Steinman argues, is that he realises the futility of 
the search, and gives up the quest of constant image-
making when he accepts the Shape all light's cup of 
Nepenthe. The only way to keep from being overwhelmed 
by Life is to refuse to acknowledge the futility of 
the search process, as the speaker does in his final 
question which shows he does not understand Rousseau. 
Steinman ends by admitting that "love and poetry 
depend on self-deception of a sort" (p.33). 
Angela Leighton also focusses on the sense of 
loss that gives rise to image-making in her book 
entitled Shelley and the Sublime: An Interpretation 
of the Major Poems. 32 Leighton finds a distinction in 
Shelley's writing between 'the original intense 
'appreciation of life'" ( p. 152) and the actual process 
of living. The latter inevitably brings about the loss 
31 Lisa M. Steinman, "From 'Alastor' to 'The 
Triumph of Life': Shelley on the Nature and Source of 
Linguistic Pleasure", Romanticism Past and Present, 7 
(1983), 23-36. 
32 Angela Leighton, Shelley and the Sublime: An 
Interpretation of the Major Poems (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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of the former. Shelley illustrates this process in 
"The Triumph of Life" through the series of wakings 
which both the speaker and Rousseau undergo, wakings 
that suppress what went before. Forgetfulness becomes 
the keynote of the poem, a forgetfulness that is 
'threaded' with memory. Like Steinman, Leighton 
believes in the search for origins, but in her 
reading, the searcher fails because of this oblivion 
which erases experience as soon as it has happened. 
The resulting sense of loss makes the imagination 
manufacture images in an effort to remember, and so 
the act of forgetting becomes inspirational. Rousseau, 
unfortunately, is unable to recognise this ability, 
and so lives in loss. Nevertheless, Leighton insists 
that the "act of commemoration" (p.175) is the real 
triumph in the poem. 
Jean Hall's thesis in The Transforming Image: A 
Study of Shelley's Major Poetry33 also adopts a 
positive interpretation of Shelleyan language 
theories. She retraces Shelley's philosophical roots 
in British empiricism and Godwinism to show that 
Shelley saw the impossibility of an ontology as 
exhilarating and freeing. Poetry can dissolve the 
meaning-through-habit process that is our usual 
experience by applying new contexts to static visual 
images in the poetry, so creating a new, unified 
perspective. This is not a platonic, transcendent 
unity, but a self-created, language-conceived, 
constantly changing unity. Hall applies this rather 
sketchily to "The Triumph of Life", arguing that the 
hell of illusion in which the multitude and Rousseau 
are immersed is a result of their misuse of the 
'transforming images', and as such is self-created. 
She believes that the Shape all light is such an 
33 Jean Hall, The Transforming Image: A 
Shelley's Major Poetry (Urbana, Chicago, 




image, and if Rousseau could alter his perception he 
could use her to transform his context into a heaven. 
His failure to do so is a warning to the speaker, 
whose world will be what he makes it. 
The tendency with these representational readings 
is towards a growing pessimism. Tillottama Rajan' s 
book Dark Interpreter: The Discourse of Romanticism34 
could be placed at an intermediate point on the 
spectrum, exploring as it does deconstruction in the 
Romantics. Rajan defines deconstruction as a 
dismantling of the overt, authorized meaning of the 
text by a subconscious meaning that runs counter to 
the authorized meaning, thus revealing disunity and 
potential collapse. 35 The Romantics' 'text' of the 
idealizing imagination is thus undermined by a 
subconscious subtext that shows their poetic 
constructions to be solipsistically-created and 
therefore unrelated to any reality. In her chapter on 
Shelley entitled "Visionary and Questioner: Idealism 
and Scepticism in Shelley's Poetry", Rajan argues that 
Shelley's idealism is not replaced by scepticism, but 
is rather postponed. In "The Triumph of Life", 
however, Shelley depicts a confrontation between a 
visionary and a sceptic, and as the poem proceeds, the 
subtext of doubt emerges and disrupts the text, 
rendering all the symbols ambiguous as they change in 
signification. The poem's process shows how good and 
bad are inextricably intertwined, and when both 
Rousseau and the speaker realise this, the need for a 
transcendent ideal is revised and life accepted. This 
achievement of 'purgatorial wisdom' releases one's 
34 Tillottama Rajan, Dark Interpreter: The 
Discourse of Romanticism (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1980). 
35 Rajan cannot really be called a 
deconstructionist, however, as she locates this 
process as occurring only in some texts, and not as 
the fundamental character of all language-use. 
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creativity; we can be our own god, but to do so we 
must submit to the lasting misery of Life. 
There is a strong case for including this reading 
in the 'anti-idealist' category of this critical 
history, and this very point indicates the rather 
arbitrary nature of the categories, and the 
interchange between them. I have included Rajan in 
this section, however, because of her focus on the 
shifting signification of language to reveal new 
perspectives. 
Michael O'Neill approaches the same theme from a 
different path, suggesting that Shelley's method was 
to ask questions that mobilized the imagination into 
creative image-making. In "Shelley's 'The Triumph of 
Life' : Questioning and Imagining", 36 0' Neill argues 
that the poem does not take a fixed stance, but by 
constant questioning, it tests its experiences. This 
takes the form of repeated image-making, and it is 
this process that gives the poem its energy and life. 
O'Neill focusses on several images in the poem to show 
how the vehicle of the metaphor is rich with 
possibilities (whether from ambiguity, or from links 
to previous literary sources), but the tenor is 
uncertain, and often absent. O'Neill argues that this 
is a deliberate method of Shelley's that springs from 
his awareness of the gap between experience and 
meaning. Shelley refuses to 'gloss his imaginings' 
( p. 180), not from a sense of nihilism, but from a 
sense of freedom. 
William Keach's penetrating analysis of Shelley's 
stylistic methods in Shelley's Style37 does not give a 
36 Michael O'Neill, "Shelley's 'The Triumph of 
Life': Questioning and Imagining", in An Infinite 
Complexity: Essays in Romanticism, ed. J. R. Watson 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press for the 
University of Durham, 1983). 
37 William Keach, Shelley's Style (New York and 
London: Methuen, 1984). 
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complete analysis of "The Triumph of Life", but does 
make several pertinent conclusions concerning it. 
Responding to de Man's comment that the poem's 
language makes random phonetic links (in rhyme) which 
also create semantic links, Keach argues that de Man 
effaces the role of poet in this process, and he 
asserts that Shelley's "compositional intelligence 
[was] fully in touch with the arbitrariness of its 
expressive medium yet capable of shaping that 
arbitrariness into, as well as according to, precisely 
provisional 'constraints of meaning'" (p.188). He 
gives this argument an unapologetically biographical 
background by showing how several important lyrics 
revealing Shelley's anxiety about personal 
relationships ( such as "Lines written in the Bay of 
Lerici") are interjected in "The Triumph" manuscript 
between two crucial lines of Rousseau's: ' ... my words 
were seeds of misery - / Even as the deeds of others'" 
(11.280-281). Keach points out that these lines can be 
interpreted in two ways: writing as a product of real 
suffering, or writing producing real suffering. Cause 
and effect between language and experience are 
blurred. These ambiguous lines juxtaposed with the 
above-mentioned lyrics suggest to Keach that Shelley's 
anxiety about relationships is linked with "an 
agitated uncertainty about writing, about verbal 
representation" (p.233). These times of anxiety, Keach 
believes, produce Shelley's most powerful poetry. 
The seminal work for many of the above 
commentaries is Paul de Man's essay "Shelley 
Disfigured: 'The Triumph of Life'", 38 although de Man's 
reading is far more pessimistic than these, seeing as 
it does the deconstructi ve process in the poem as 
38 Paul de Man, "Shelley Disfigured:'The Triumph 
of life'", in Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold 
Bloom et. al. (New York: The Seabury Press; London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). 
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random and finally uncontrollable. 
De Man begins by outlining the traditional human 
desire to understand the present by interpreting the 
past. As with the speaker and Rousseau, who ask 
questions, we all try to understand the meaning of the 
text (of our lives, or of the poem) by building up a 
series of meanings until we have frozen the text into 
a statue that we 'understand'. De Man calls this 
"monumentalization". He then shows how this is a false 
process for "The Triumph", which has gone through 
numerous drafts which alter meanings appreciably . This 
shows how monumentalization is illusory, because each 
question about meaning is forgotten, or effaced, as 
soon as it is asked. This 'defacement' is the central 
movement of the poem for de Man, and is exemplified 
in Rousseau, who begins from a position of self-
knowledge, where his words and actions are unified, 
but who moves through a series of such defacements, 
until he arrives at the "unbearable condition of 
indetermination" (p.130), or not knowing. In the 
process he is physically defaced or disfigured as 
well . De Man argues that this is the same experience 
we have in trying to read "The Triumph"; figures 
created by language are undermined by language; 
causality and temporality are lost; "the meaning 
glimmers, hovers, and wavers, but refuses to yield the 
clarity it keeps announcing" (p.131). In thematising 
this endless process by which language disfigures 
itself, and our ineffectual attempts to prevent the 
process and glean a meaning, Shelley does not 
denounce, or celebrate, but simply recognizes, Life. 
David Quint, another of the earliest 
representational critics, takes a different approach 
to de Man, in his essay "Representation and Ideology 
in 'The Triumph of Life' . 1139 His central argument is 
39 David Quint, "Representation and Ideology in 
'The Triumph of Life'", SEL, 18 (1978), 639-657. 
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that the imagination, with human love, is infinite, 
but the words by which such imaginative experiences 
are expressed are finite. Thus the free imagination 
is restricted and imprisoned in its very act of image-
making, and worse, cannot see its restriction and 
begins to worship the images it has created. It is 
this "deformation of the imaginative experience into 
ideology" (p.639) that Quint identifies as the subject 
of "The Triumph of Life". Quoting the Essay on Love, 
Quint shows how our sense of an unconstituted selfhood 
initiates a desire for external self-representation: 
we create mental images, satisfying our infinite 
capacities with finite representation, and so 
suffocating our ability to continue image-making. 
This is the fault Rousseau slips into; he creates the 
Shape all light and then submits authority to her. It 
is also the speaker's mistake, who creates the image 
of Rousseau. Both fall prey to the Shape in the 
chariot, who stands for the principle of ideology. 
Finally, Quint challenges, the onus is on the reader 
to refuse to impose any ideology on his or her own 
reading of the poem. 
Lloyd Abbey follows on from Quint's argument in 
his book published a year later, entitled Destroyer 
and Preserver: Shelley's Poetic Skepticism. 40 In it 
he states that Shelley was in a state of "almost total 
philosophical uncertainty" ( p. 7) throughout his 
career, and refused to embrace any dogma. Using 
Pulos' thesis that Shelley was split between intuitive 
idealism and scepticism, Abbey describes the poet as 
a 'preserver' (saving his intuitions in poetry) and 
yet also a 'destroyer' (undermining faith in images, 
in words and in poetry) . Finally poetry is questioned 
as a false dogma, and this is the situation that Abbey 
40 Lloyd Abbey, Des troy er and Preserver: 
Shelley's Poetic Skepticism (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1979). 
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finds in "The Triumph of Life". In this poem, all 
images change and self-destruct, finally being 
subsumed into the natural cycle of day and night. 
They have no 'meaning', and even Shelley's images of 
the ideal are completely deconstructed. Abbey makes 
a faint suggestion that the acceptance of this 
situation frees Shelley's mind for moral action, but 
confirms that there is little evidence of this in the 
poem. 
A philosophy of relativity is presented by 
Richard Cronin in his book, Shelley's Poetic 
Thoughts. 41 Unlike "The Triumph's" sources, which, 
Cronin says, represent experience as series of veils 
removed via contemplation to reveal an absolute, 
perfect reality, in "The Triumph" no such reality is 
revealed when veils are removed. Rather, the world is 
labyrinthine, without ethical or metaphysical 
certainty. The lights in the poem have no hierarchical 
order, but alter meaning according to their relation 
with each other. Rousseau is an unreliable guide. The 
only absolute the 'sacred few' - is crucially 
absent, and so its validity as an absolute is 
seriously questioned. Finally, states Cronin, the 
poem's value depends on whether the reader is prepared 
to accept its inconclusiveness. 
In 1985, J. Hillis Miller published The 
Linguistic Moment: From Wordsworth to Stevens, 42 which 
included an essay written at the time of Paul de Man's 
essay. It outlines a reading very close to de Man's, 
as the two men collaborated in their discussions on 
the poem. Miller reveals the basic pattern of "The 
Triumph of Life" to be the perception of seemingly 
41 Richard Cronin, Shelley's Poetic Thoughts 
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981). 
42 J. Hillis Miller, The Linguistic Moment: From 
Wordsworth to Stevens (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1985). 
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binary opposites - such as day and night, power and 
misery, actor and victim which are actually 
different versions of the same thing. When these 
oppositions merge, they annihilate each other, leaving 
a residue that begins the process again. Miller uses 
the image of 'folding' (as mentioned in the last line 
of the poem) to illustrate this process: a single 
entity is folded into two opposing entities, split and 
yet joined by the fold. This process of perception in 
which we see and name by oppositions, can continue 
forever, unbroken. Humanity becomes "the dupe of 
self-generated signs" (p.116). 
Miller demonstrates the relativity and 
subjectivity of 'naming' by showing how the sun of the 
first forty lines of the poem is delineated by several 
simultaneously-developed personifications which are 
layered on top of each other. The final 'meaning' of 
the sun is unknown; it is assigned roles which are not 
"intrinsic to the element itself" (p.133) but which 
depend upon its relation to other elements. This 
process is the condition of life, and each renaming 
obliterates the previous name, in a kind of erasure or 
forgetting similar to de Man's. Rousseau's 
'memories', Miller concludes, are extrapolations from 
his perception of his present: they are inferred 
namings. Similarly, the reader cannot escape this 
process of figuration, but can only enter into it and 
become its victim, renaming, erasing and renaming 
again. 
It is appropriate to conclude this critical 
history by discussing Jerrold Hogle's extraordinarily 
subtle and extensive reinterpretation of Shelley's 
thought and writings in the recently published 
Shelley's Process: Radical Transference and the 
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Development of His Major Works. 43 Hogle outlines 
Shelley's "shifting, evanescent" style in which figure 
moves into figure in abrupt transitions (p.3), and he 
combines this with Shelley's constant reference to a 
power or prime force that preexists human 
consciousness and will. Hogle rejects most Shelleyan 
commentaries which see Shelley's style as a symptom of 
his belief in a unified, centred power or force, 
whether of a quasi-platonic, linguistic or even 
Christian nature. Instead, Hogle suggests that Shelley 
rewrites the western ideas of the "One", presenting a 
decentred process of transference which both initiates 
and is enacted in human thought. In this transference 
each basic thought is a motion between other thoughts, 
arising out of past perceptions and looking forward 
to future perceptions. Shelley's writings evince this 
criss-crossing process, leaping from image to image as 
each transforms the last. This, for Shelley, is the 
"motion that produces mind", as the process also 
effaces itself, making only its product recognisable. 
This relational thinking "explodes the most 
conventional thought-relations into interconnections 
with others that were rarely thought to be analogous 
before. That disruption prepares the psyche, first to 
accept all possible relations between transferred 
thoughts ... as genuine equals, and then to defer to 
what the self and others have yet to think and have 
yet to become ... " ( p. 27) . In short, it leads to 
selfless love. 
In "The Triumph of Life" Hogle believes that 
43 Jerrold E. Hogle, Shelley's Process: Radical 
Transference and the Development of His Major Works 
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
Hogle's book only became available to me after my own 
interpretation of "The Triumph" had been written. 
There are, nevertheless, many similar conclusions in 
our readings, although Hogle's final thesis of the 
possibility of positive life through a new way of 
thought is obviously very different to my own. 
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Shelley brings together in the Shape all light all his 
previous figures for this new "One" of decentred 
process. She is "transference embodied" (p.323), as 
she changes from image into image in a constant 
movement of tropes. She is both the impulse to change 
and the change itself, and she also shows the 
forgetting that takes place as each new image emerges 
in her effect on Rousseau. He, as a shade in the 
afterlife, recalls his experience of her as a warning 
to the narrator of the poem. The terrible danger to 
the process of free transference is the wilful 
decision to objectify and fix thoughts, thus creating 
tyrannical external centres of perceived 'truth' that 
in turn prevent true transference. Rousseau's mistake 
was to see in the Shape all light an external centre 
of knowledge about himself. She offered full 
transference in the cup of Nepenthe, but he only 
sipped at it and so received only partial, perverted 
transference . Similar errors are seen in the followers 
and captives of the chariot of Life, who give off 
shadows in a constant transference of thoughts but who 
objectify those shadows into static, impenetrable 
versions that repress the people. Even the narrator 
has revealed this tendency to objectification and 
fallen thought in his description of the sunrise and 
the chariot of Life. 
Hogle concludes that the Shape all light presents 
another option to this triumph of objective signs over 
shapes of thought. The self-effacing nature of her 
action, though, means that this option may never be 
noticed by narrator or reader. The poem's oscillation 
between these two options - "Life as a state of 
subjection to objective 'impressions'" or Life as "a 
revelling in transference without a longing for final 
knowledge" (p.338) - is never finally stilled. 
* * * * 
Hogle' s reading concludes this brief critical 
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history. There are, no doubt, other commentators on 
"The Triumph of Life" who have not been included 
here; I have, however, endeavoured to discuss those 
whom I feel to be most useful. As we move into the 
close commentary that follows, more detailed aspects 
of the above readings will emerge. 
